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In the eighteen months since it came down, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion1 has variously been described as a “watershed,”2 a “game-changer,”3
and perhaps even “[t]he most significant”4 case of the Court’s 2010 Term. I share this assessment,
but not for the familiar reasons. In my view, Concepcion is significant not so much because of
what it portends for the future of aggregate litigation or the ability of small-dollar plaintiffs to


Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I thank Jennifer Brown, Michael Helfand, David
Horton, and participants at both the Yale/Quinnipiac Dispute Resolution Workshop held at Yale Law School in
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judgment.
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redress systematic wrongdoing by large-scale defendants,5 but because it signals something of a
paradigm shift in the law of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)6 preemption.
Because the facts of Concepcion are now well known, I recite only those details relevant
to my argument: The Concepcions signed up for AT&T service, which AT&T advertised as
coming with a free phone. Although they received the free phone, the Concepcions were charged
an additional $30.22 in sales tax based on the phone’s retail value, so they filed a putative class
action against AT&T for fraud and false advertising. When AT&T moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to a clause in its customer agreement, the Concepcions argued that the clause was
unconscionable under a 2005 precedent from the California Supreme Court by the name of
Discover Bank v. Superior Court.7 Discover Bank held that collective action waivers (whether in
arbitration or litigation) are presumptively unconscionable when they are
found in [1] a consumer contract of adhesion [2] in a setting in which
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small
amounts of damages, and [3] when it is alleged that the party with the
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of
money.8

The district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Concepcions and, moreover, held that
Discover Bank was not preempted by the FAA. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed these lower
court preemption holdings.
This Article proceeds as follows. I begin Part I with what I think of as the puzzle of
Concepcion: Notwithstanding the majority’s declarations to the contrary, Concepcion represents a
significant break from the traditional justifications offered for FAA preemption of state law.
What, then, is the explanation for the Court’s decision to preempt Discover Bank? In Part II, I
offer an answer: Concepcion turns on what I have elsewhere described as an antidiscrimination
theory of FAA preemption. Understanding how that theory plays out both in the majority’s
decision and in the parties’ briefing of the issues will, I argue, help account for many aspects of
the opinion that have so far been left unexplained.
To say that Concepcion is animated by an antidiscrimination theory of the FAA does not,
however, imply anything about the nature of that theory or whether the Court got it correct. In
Part III, I demonstrate that even though the theory has routinely been invoked over the past three
decades to legitimize the FAA’s displacement of state law, it remains vastly underdeveloped and
poorly understood. From this point of view, the problem with Concepcion is less that a majority
of the Court decided the case based on ideology or policy preferences, as many have argued,9 and
more that the lack of any clear standards or limits to the antidiscrimination theory leaves the
5

See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012); James Vicini, Supreme Court Rules for AT&T in Arbitration Case,
REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-att-arbitrationidUSTRE73Q4N520110427.
6
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2009).
7
113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
8
Id. at 1110.
9
In any event, this is arguably true of most cases decided by the High Court. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert
D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989).
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theory prone to abuse in whichever direction the wind happens to blow. In Part IV, I draw on the
collective learning in the antidiscrimination area to critique the Court’s opinion and to suggest
that, with a more sophisticated understanding of what it means to discriminate against arbitration,
the result in Concepcion would and should have been very different.

I.

THE PUZZLE OF CONCEPCION

To understand the puzzle at the core of Concepcion, it will be necessary first to review
the law of FAA preemption. FAA preemption is a species of conflict preemption, pursuant to
which state law will be displaced if and only if it somehow conflicts with or “stands as an
obstacle” to the text or purpose of a federal statute.10
The text of FAA section 2 provides that a “[1] written provision . . . to submit [specified
disputes] to arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, [2] save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”11 The first clause of
section 2 has generally been understood as a mandate to “rigorously enforce”12 arbitration
agreements “according to their terms.”13 Following Richard Nagareda, I refer to this as the
“command clause.”14 Any state law that stands as an obstacle to the command clause will be
preempted by the FAA. For example, where the parties’ agreement contains an agreement to
arbitrate any and all disputes, a state law that prohibits the arbitration of wage disputes will be
preempted because it prevents enforcement of the agreement strictly as written.15
The second clause of section 2 contains the only exceptions to the command clause thus
far recognized by the Court. This so-called “savings clause” has widely been understood as
allowing states to regulate arbitration agreements so long as they do so using “generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”16 As the Court put it,
“if [a state] law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of
contracts generally,” then the law is not preempted.17 Applications of the unconscionability
defense to invalidate arbitration clauses have for this reason almost uniformly avoided
preemption, even when the application is alleged to “single out” arbitration agreements for
unfavorable treatment.18

10

See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)).
11
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009). Section 2 is the only provision of the FAA that the Court has used to preempt state law.
See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006).
12
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
13
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989). The injunction
to enforce arbitration agreements to the letter effectively means that arbitration clauses must be enforced
“notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
14
See Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1069, 1075–76 (2011).
15
See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
16
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (citation omitted).
17
Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
18
See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1287–88 (2011).
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As part of California’s common law of unconscionability, Discover Bank fell within the
savings clause and for this reason should have been spared from preemption according to the
principles outlined above. But the Court did just the opposite. Concepcion therefore violates
much of what we thought we knew about the interaction between the command and savings
clauses.
To be sure, conflict preemption is not limited to situations in which the state law collides
head-on with the plain language of a federal statute; it also covers situations in which the state
law is consistent with the statutory text but nonetheless frustrates the text’s “‘purposes and
objectives.’”19 Concepcion might, therefore, be understood as making this type of determination
about Discover Bank. To see whether this is the case, we must first come to grips with the
purposes and objectives behind section 2’s command and savings clauses.
Perhaps the leading view is that those clauses, and the FAA more generally, seek to
honor arbitration agreements qua contracts.20 “Arbitration agreements are purely matters of
contract, and the effect of the [FAA] is simply to make the contracting party live up to his
agreement.”21 State laws are accordingly preempted when they undermine the enforceability of
arbitration agreements. I refer to this as the “contract theory.” Another view, which might be
referred to as the “favoritism theory,” holds that state laws are preempted if they disfavor
arbitration or arbitration agreements. Most commentators (both critical and supportive of the
opinion) appear to believe that Concepcion can be squared with one or both of these purposes and
objectives.22
I begin this Article with the following bold claim: Concepcion cannot be explained on
either the contract or the favoritism theories. If I am correct, the basic puzzle of Concepcion
comes into focus: What is the real reason why the Court held Discover Bank preempted?
Otherwise stated, to what purpose or objective of the FAA did the Court believe Discover Bank
stood as an obstacle?

A. The Twilight of Contract
Prior to the enactment of the FAA in 1925, it was virtually impossible to compel
arbitration of disputes. The traditional explanation is that early common law courts, jealous of
competition from private adjudicative forums, had devised artificial rules that thwarted the
enforcement of promises to arbitrate for no apparent reason other than an “irrational,” “unjust,”
and “anachronis[tic]” hostility toward the arbitral process.23

19

Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67

(1941)).
20

See Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.
GEORGE S. GRAHAM, TO VALIDATE CERTAIN AGREEMENTS FOR ARBITRATION, H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924).
22
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: How the Supreme
Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 144–45 (2012); Craig Hoover et al., Supreme
Court Rules that Arbitration Agreements Can Foreclose Classwide Arbitration Proceedings, MONDAQ (May 4, 2011),
available at
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/131144/Arbitration+Dispute+Resolution/Supreme+Court+Rules+That+Arbitrat
ion+Agreements+Can+Foreclose+Classwide+Arbitration+Procedures.
23
Aragaki, supra note 18, at 1253.
21
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On the contract theory, the “basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act [was] to
overcome [these] refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”24 The rationale is that there is little
defensible basis for enforcing an arbitration agreement with less determination than any other
contract.25 This is why arbitration agrements may be regulated only through rules that “arose to
govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally”26—
not through rules like the old common law ouster and revocability doctrines that applied only to
arbitration agreements.27 Thus, “[s]uccessful challenges to arbitration [agreements] must find
their basis in contract law, not some other source of law” like employment or consumer
protection law.28 Consistent with the contract theory, the district court and the Ninth Circuit in
Concepcion reasoned that Discover Bank avoided preemption because it was nothing more than a
judicial precedent for the application of the common law unconscionability defense.29
But the Court reached the opposite conclusion. It held that Discover Bank conflicted with
section 2’s “overarching purpose to ‘ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according
to their terms.’”30 Although this may sound consistent with the contract theory, on closer
inspection it is not. The only way to square the Court’s conclusion with the contract view is if the
Discover Bank rule somehow does not qualify as a generally applicable contract defense—for
example, because it is a rogue version of unconscionability otherwise unknown to the common
law of contracts. During briefing on certiorari and on the merits, AT&T and its amici pressed this
very point, arguing that the California rule was a “distortion” that “b[ore] no resemblance” to
traditional unconscionability law.31
This argument did not win the day, however. It was rejected in no uncertain terms by
justices on both sides of the aisle during oral argument,32 and it was also quietly dismissed in the
Court’s opinion. After noting that general unconscionability requires both a procedural and a
substantive element, for instance, the majority concluded that Discover Bank had in fact “applied

24

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs.
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
25
See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 28, 51–52 (1918).
26
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
27
See generally Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE L.J.
147 (1921) (describing ouster and revocability doctrines).
28
See STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 738 (2001); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for
Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements–With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J.
AM. ARB. 251, 265 (2006); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 195 (1998).
29
See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom., AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Laster v. T-Mobile U.S.A., Inc., No. 05–CV–1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at
**7–8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008).
30
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs.
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
31
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25–26, 31, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2010)
(No. 09–893); Brief for Petitioner at 18, 32, 47, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09–893). See generally Brief Amici
Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09–893) (arguing
that California courts have “distorted” traditional common law unconscionability principles beyond recognition); Brief
of DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No.
09–893) (arguing that Discover Bank “departs” from traditional unconscionability doctrine).
32
See infra notes 152–153 and accompanying text.
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this framework” fair and square to class action waivers.33 Indeed, any other conclusion would
have put the Court in the deeply problematic posture of accusing the final arbiter of California
law of misapprehending its own doctrine of unconscionability when it decided Discover Bank.
The Court therefore had little choice but to accept Discover Bank as a bona fide principle of state
contract law.
Concepcion therefore amounts to the proposition that a perfectly valid application of a
generally applicable contract doctrine is nonetheless preempted by the FAA.34 This is evident in
Justice Scalia’s remark that “[a]lthough § 2’s savings clause preserves generally applicable
contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”35 In other words, it is possible for a
state-law rule to frustrate the FAA even if it counts as generally applicable.
This is a complete and substantial break from the contract theory. If there was one thing
that had seemed settled, it was that the FAA’s commitment to arbitration as a creature of contract
meant that arbitration agreements would be made “enforceable as other contracts, but not more
so.”36 Concepcion changed all of that overnight.37 If FAA preemption no longer turns on whether
the state law is a genuine contract law defense, the contract paradigm cannot fully explain FAA
preemption after Concepcion. A fortiori, it no longer captures the purposes and objectives of the
FAA in quite the same way it did before. Something else, therefore, must be at work.
Here it is often retorted that Concepcion is perfectly consistent with the contract theory
because the Court enforced the collective action waiver in AT&T’s customer agreement strictly
according to its terms, Discover Bank notwithstanding.38 The problem with this retort is that it
confuses the contract paradigm with one based on freedom of contract. The Court’s decision
might well be described as consistent with freedom of contract insofar as it displaced a state rule
that limited the parties’ prerogative to “structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”39
But that is not the same as the contract theory’s emphasis on “bring[ing] private contractual
arbitration agreements into general contract law”40—that is, on holding arbitration contracts to the
same requirements of validity and enforceability imposed on other contracts. Far from
synonymous with the ideal of unbridled private autonomy, contract law represents a continuing
endeavor to balance that ideal against the protection of public values. This is why, as far back as
the classical period, the common law singled out a variety of contracts and contract provisions for
33
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746; see also Phillip M. Lax, Collective Action Waivers in Labor Law: Why They
are Unenforceable Even After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 11 (Mar. 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017950.
34
See, e.g., Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (observing that
Concepcion “characterize[d]” the Discover Bank standard “as arising from the ‘generally applicable’ contract law
doctrine of unconscionability”).
35
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
36
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (emphasis added).
37
Accord Cunningham, supra note 22, at 144–45 (arguing that, if Concepcion had been faithful to contract
principles, it would have struck AT&T’s class waiver consistent with state contract law).
38
See, e.g., Andrew McBride & Thomas McCarthy, Supreme Court Observations: AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, THE LEGAL PULSE (Apr. 29, 2011), http://wlflegalpulse.com/2011/04/29/supreme-court-observations-attmobility-v-concepcion/.
39
Volt, 489 U.S at 479.
40
David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act's
Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 137–38 (2004) (emphasis added).
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regulation in the public interest.41 Even during the height of the Lochner era, courts never
pretended to enforce contracts exactly as written.42
Moreover, it is not even clear that Concepcion is consistent with freedom of contract.
Many would argue that consumers are not in any real sense “free” when they acquiesce to terms
contained in adhesion contracts like AT&T’s service agreement.43 If so, preempting Discover
Bank would seem to exacerbate rather than mitigate this unfreedom. It is also doubtful whether a
law such as Discover Bank can be understood as reducing liberty of contract simply because it
interferes with the parties’ agreement as written, and thus whether displacing Discover Bank
tends to increase that liberty.44 For example, would we consider contracting parties to be freer if
the state held them to an agreement that had been procured by fraud or duress?45 An agreement
that turns out to be impracticable? Or one that lacks consideration? The lesson here is that
common law defenses such as unconscionability can do just as much to augment freedom of
contract as they can to diminish it. Taken to its logical terminus, the retort leads to the untenable
proposition that contracts should be enforced just for the sake of enforcement, no matter what
their effect on other values such as voluntary consent, procedural fairness, or the reasonable
expectations of the parties.

B.

The Twilight of Favoritism

A discussion of the favoritism theory cannot proceed without resolving a threshold
question about the supposed object of favoritism: Does the FAA seek to favor arbitration or
arbitration agreements? The Court has used both formulations interchangeably,46 which in turn
enables lower courts to exploit the indeterminacy to justify FAA preemption outcomes based on
policy rather than principle. To be sure, it is entirely possible to favor both the arbitration process

41

See Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the Age of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, in
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103, 103, 108 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of
Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 482–86 (1909); Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 373 (1921)
(noting that English courts before the 19th century refused to enforce a variety of contracts contrary to public policy).
42
See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 448–49 (1993).
43
See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 675–77 (1996).
44
See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 315 (1975)
(“Properly understood, [freedom of contract] does not require a court to enforce every contract brought before it.”).
45
Richard Epstein, among others, has argued that economic duress, nondisclosure, the statute of frauds, and
certain applications of the doctrine of capacity are not in fact consistent with the freedom of contract ideal. See id. at
297–302. This would suggest that many general contract defenses currently presumed to fall within the savings clause
might become problematic if freedom of contract were taken to be the touchstone for FAA preemption.
46
The lack of precision here is truly astounding. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 479–81 (1989) (noting the FAA’s policy of “strongly favor[ing] the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate” and later referring to favoritism of “arbitration proceedings” as a “method of resolving disputes”); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625, 630 (1985) (explaining that the “‘liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements’ . . . is at bottom a policy guaranteeing enforcement of private contractual
arrangements” and then relying on the “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution”); Moses H. Cone
Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting at once that Section 2 embodies a “liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements” and that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration.”).
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and the agreements that give rise to it. Nonetheless, I shall argue that the best interpretation of the
theory is that federal arbitration law seeks to favor arbitration qua process, not qua contract.
There are at least three reasons why.
First, one of the main objectives of the FAA was to overturn the old “revocability”
doctrine,47 which allowed a reluctant party to revoke her promise to arbitrate existing or future
disputes at any time prior to issuance of the award. Revocability does not go to the question of
whether the arbitration agreement is valid or enforceable, because the non-revoking party was
always entitled to money damages for breach.48 Instead, because the right of revocation simply
prevents a court from ordering specific performance of the promise to arbitrate, revocability goes
only to the question of remedy—whether a court may compel resort to the arbitration process.49 A
significant part of the FAA’s charge, therefore, was the vindication of arbitration as a process
rather than a promise.
Second, favoring arbitration agreements is better understood as a means to an end rather
than an end in itself.50 If arbitration agreements were ends in themselves, there would be little
more for the FAA to do beyond reversing the old ouster doctrine, which made pre-dispute
arbitration agreements void. The validity of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement could then be
enforced by the award of money damages without so much as a single arbitration proceeding ever
taking place.51 But the FAA does so much more: Among other things, it creates procedures for
compelling arbitration, for staying or barring related litigation, for appointing arbitrators and
conducting hearings, for enforcing arbitral awards as court judgments, and for vacating and

47

This is one of the chief reasons why the command clause makes arbitration clauses falling within its purview
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009) (emphasis added); see Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2
of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847, 854–
56 (1960). The other reason was to overturn the ouster doctrine. See infra note 49.
48
See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION
20 (1992) (adding that money damages were typically nominal); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:
Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 973 (1999).
49
By contrast, the ouster doctrine went to the question of validity, although apparently only to the validity of predispute arbitration agreements. See Scott v. Avery, [1856] 10 Eng. Rep. 1135, 1138 (H.L.); Charles Newton Hulvey,
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, 15 VA. L. REV. 238, 238 (1929); Note, supra note 47, at 854 n.46. Post-dispute
arbitration agreements were considered perfectly valid, even though the revocability doctrine could still be invoked to
deny specific performance. Thus, pre-FAA law allowed a court to compel the enforcement of some arbitration
agreements (namely, post-dispute arbitration agreements, through the remedy of money damages), but never to compel
the arbitration process.
50
Although they might agree in the final analysis, most judges and commentators remain confused about this
basic point. See Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1238–39 (2011); Brief of
Arbitration Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14–18, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (No. 09–893). A notable exception is Justice Stevens, who demonstrated a particularly lucid
understanding of the means-ends distinction in his dissenting opinion in Hall Street Associates., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576 (2008). There, he reasoned that “American courts were generally hostile to arbitration. They refused,
with rare exceptions, to order specific enforcement of executory agreements arbitrate. Section 2 of the FAA responded
to this hostility by making written arbitration agreements ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.’” Id. at 593 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
51
Whether the agreement is enforced by specific performance or money damages is not, after all, an issue of
enforcement or validity but one of remedy. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 293–94 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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modifying such awards.52 The FAA’s true object of concern, therefore, is not so much the
agreement itself as the process that the agreement makes possible.53
Third, it is difficult to appreciate what it means to favor arbitration agreements other than
eliminating needless impediments to their enforcement.54 But if so, this begins to sound much like
the contract theory’s emphasis on “rigorously enforc[ing]” such agreements. To avoid
redundancy, therefore, the favoritism theory is best interpreted as directed toward the arbitration
process.
If the foregoing is correct, Concepcion is anything but favorable to arbitration. As many
of us have already noted,55 the opinion is infected to the core with the very same limiting beliefs
about arbitration that the Court has spent the better part of three decades attempting to debunk.
“Arbitration,” the majority declared, “is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.”56
“Arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of
certification,” so that it is “at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with
ensuring that third parties’ due process rights are satisfied.”57 Unlike the de novo review of class
certification questions available in court, arbitrators’ class certification decisions are not
appealable.58 And although the resulting award is subject to the FAA’s vacatur standards, those
standards amount to “no effective means of review.”59
In an early line of cases, the Court used similar uncharitable assessments about arbitration
to undo valid, broadly-worded arbitration agreements.60 Thus, in holding that a claim under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)61 was nonarbitrable, the Court held that:
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See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–7, 9–11 (2009).
See STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 33 (2d ed. 2007) (“Central to the
FAA is its requirement that courts enforce arbitration agreements with the remedy of specific performance.”). In the
same vein, even critics argue that the real motivation behind the Court’s FAA jurisprudence is to secure an alternative
forum to help alleviate crowded court dockets. See, e.g., Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme
Court's Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 830
(2002); Sternlight, supra note 43, at 661.
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Accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (defining the “liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” as “at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private
contractual arrangements . . . .”).
55
See Ian D. Mitchell & Richard Bales, Concepcion and Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 4 Y.B.
ARB. & MED. (forthcoming 2012); Hiro Aragaki, Status and contract in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, SCOTUSBLOG
(Sept. 14, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/status-and-contract-in-att-mobility-v-concepcion/.
56
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).
57
Id. at 1750, 1752.
58
Id. at 1752.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (stating that arbitration is “[not] an
adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding”); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (calling
arbitration “inferior” to courtroom adjudication); cf. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (considering it “fantastic” that arbitrators could “decide legal issues”).
61
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–262 (2011).
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[M]any arbitrators may not be conversant with the public law
considerations underlying the FLSA. FLSA claims typically involve
complex mixed questions of fact and law . . . . Although an arbitrator
may be competent to resolve many preliminary factual questions, such
as whether the employee “punched in” when he said he did, he may
lack the competence to decide the ultimate legal issue [of] whether an
employee’s right to a minimum wage or to overtime pay under the
statute has been violated.62

Similarly, in Wilko v. Swan,63 the Court declared that arbitration was not an adequate alternative
to a trial with respect to claims under the Securities Act of 1933, in part because the FAA’s
vacatur standards were no substitute for “judicial review for error.”64
The Court’s more recent position is that these earlier cases were “pervaded by . . . ‘the
old judicial hostility to arbitration’”65—in other words, that they positively “disfavor[ed]
arbitration” and were “far out of step” with the Court’s “current strong . . . favori[tism] [of] this
method of resolving disputes.”66 If Concepcion’s limiting beliefs about arbitration are not
materially different from those found in the early nonarbitrability cases, it is difficult to
appreciate how the decision can possibly be squared with the favoritism theory.67
Concepcion is further unfavorable toward arbitration because it tends to close off new
possibilities—possibilities consistent with the early reformers’ desire to “raise arbitration to the
status and dignity of judicial process.”68 In large part, modern FAA jurisprudence has been a
jurisprudence of enablement. The “‘national policy favoring arbitration’”69 has been joined at the
hip with a trend toward greater inclusiveness with respect to the scope of disputes covered by an
arbitration agreement,70 the type of claims justiciable in arbitration,71 the range of gateway issues

62
63

Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981).
346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484

(1989).
64

Id. at 433, 436–37; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (quoting Kulukundis Shipping
Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
66
Id. at 481 (emphasis added); see also Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985).
67
As the California Supreme Court presciently observed over a decade ago and later again in Discover Bank, the
proposition that arbitration is unsuitable to class actions itself “reflects, . . . ‘the very mistrust of arbitration that has
been repudiated by the United States Supreme Court.’” Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1113 (Cal.
2005) (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 693–94 (Cal. 2000)).
68
Joseph Wheless, Arbitration as a Judicial Process of Law, 30 W. VA. L.Q. 210, 216 (1924); see also Sec.
Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989) (describing the FAA’s purpose to “legitimate”
arbitration); cf. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 6 cmt., 23 cmt. B (2000), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uarba/arbitrat1213.htm [hereinafter RUAA] (describing the RUAA’s
purpose to provide a “credibl[e]” and “true” alternative to litigation).
69
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
70
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66
B.U. L. REV. 953, 972 (1986).
71
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
7–8 (1997).
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that may be entrusted to arbitrators,72 and the menu of remedies that arbitrators may consult when
granting relief.73 A truly pro-arbitration ruling, therefore, would have seen Concepcion as an
opportunity for enriching the arbitration alternative to class action litigation; it would have found
a place at the table for this brave new thing called “class arbitration.”
By contrast, Concepcion makes arbitration and class relief mutually exclusive almost by
definition,74 and in this way represents a profoundly disabling moment in the history of modern
arbitration law.75 Arbitration and the class mechanism are conceived as static and brittle, unable
to evolve in new directions or to accommodate one another as times change. As a result, a
distinctive process of collective claiming—one responsive to not just to the weaknesses but also
to the strengths of the arbitral forum—is unlikely to see the light of day.76 This does not just mean
that there will be fewer class arbitrations; ironically, it also means that there will also be fewer
individual arbitrations.77 As Justice Breyer put it, “What rational lawyer would have signed on to
represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22
claim?”78 This cannot possibly be favorable to arbitration’s future development.
Those who persist in the belief that Concepcion is pro-arbitration make one of two errors.
The first is to confuse the policy of favoring arbitration with that of favoring arbitration
agreements. But rules that disfavor the strict enforcement of arbitration agreements, such as the
unconscionability defense and the statutory and common law vacatur rules, play an important role
in underwriting the legitimacy of the arbitration process.79 Consider a hypothetical law that would
limit the enforceability of patently unfair arbitration agreements, like the agreement at issue in
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips.80 Preempting such a law would certainly favor arbitration
agreements, but would we so easily conclude that it thereby favors arbitration?
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See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2783–85 (2010) (holding that gateway decisions
about the validity of arbitration agreements may be delegated to the arbitrators); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395 at 402–04
(holding that arbitration clauses are severable, such that disputes over the validity of the container contract must be
heard in arbitration).
73
See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 61 n.7 (1995).
74
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (stating that class arbitration “is not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA”).
75
Accord Thomas Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and
the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 68–69 (2012).
76
Cf. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner
v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 122–24 (2011) (“[O]ne could find class arbitration attractive not only because of its
potential to deal equally with similarly situated disputants but also because it might respond to . . . asymmetries
between disputants.”). To be sure, parties might still choose to incorporate class arbitration procedures, but this would
“not [be] arbitration as envisioned by the FAA,” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753, and might therefore be prone to attack
in other ways. See infra notes 254–259 and accompanying text.
77
See Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 31, 32 (2012).
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Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Supreme Court Arbitration Rhetoric v. Reality and AT&T, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Apr. 15, 2011, 6:08 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/04/supreme-court-arbitrationrhetoric-v-reality-and-att-mobility.html (arguing that simply to favor arbitration does not necessarily answer whether a
clause banning class arbitration promotes or retards that policy).
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173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing arbitration agreement that, inter alia, gave Hooters the ability to
control the composition of the arbitral panel, including by placing its own managers on the panel); see also Baravati v.
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that, consistent with the FAA, states could
prohibit parties from agreeing to have their disputes presided over by a “panel of three monkeys . . . .”).
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The second error is to confuse favoring arbitration with favoring the big businesses that
are most apt to use it.81 It is difficult to quarrel with the observation that Concepcion favors big
business, especially those keen on avoiding collective action claims (in arbitration or litigation).82
But that is not the same as saying that it favors arbitration. Consider in this vein the one thousand
or so duplicative arbitrations filed late last year by plaintiffs’ law firms on behalf of AT&T
customers seeking to block AT&T’s announced merger with T-Mobile.83 Instead of honoring its
own agreement to arbitrate, AT&T filed multiple actions in federal court seeking to block even
these individual arbitrations. It argued that arbitrating these disputes (whether individually or as a
class) would cause it irreparable injury, in part because arbitrators would be called on to evaluate
“highly sophisticated and complex econometric and engineering models” and conduct “a detailed
assessment of this evidence as it relates to the benefits to consumers and businesses”—tasks that
presumably cannot be expected from an essentially fast, cheap, and simple adjudicative forum.84
These statements may have come from the mouthpiece of arbitration’s supposed champion, but
they certainly do not favor arbitration. They are better seen as embodying the type of limiting
beliefs that the Court’s own jurisprudence in this area has sought to overturn.85
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For examples of this error, see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts that Prohibit Class-Action
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/28bizcourt.html; Jim Hamilton,
Supreme Court Ruling Continues Strong Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SEC. REG.
(Apr. 28, 2011, 11:44 AM), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/supreme-court-ruling-continues-strong.html;
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See, e.g., Complaint, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Gonnello, No. 11–CV–05636 (PKC), 2011 WL 4716617
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011). See generally Terry Baynes, AT&T Sues Customers Who Seek to Block T-Mobile Deal,
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Aug. 17, 2011),
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II.

CONCEPCION THROUGH THE LENS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION

If contract and favoritism do not provide a persuasive account of Concepcion, what does?
One answer may be that the decision is unabashedly political and abandons all pretense of a
reasoned justification.86
Against this view, I wish to suggest that Concepcion remains faithful to the general
obstacle preemption framework described in Part I. Rather than abandon that framework
altogether, it simply brings to the fore an alternative interpretation of the FAA’s purposes and
objectives, and thus an alternative theory of what a state law must look like in order to stand as an
obstacle to those objectives. As the title of this Article suggests, that alternative theory is
grounded in the idea of antidiscrimination: of reversing the common law’s unfounded
“suspicion,” “prejudice[],” and unjustified “hostility” toward arbitration.87 Coming to grips with
that theory and its implications for the FAA’s preemptive reach will prove indispensable not just
for making sense of an opinion that at first blush defies explanation, but also for developing a
more ambitious critique, one that goes beyond the accusations of judicial partisanship or
hypocrisy that have so far dominated commentary on the case.
To appreciate Concepcion’s antidiscrimination moorings, one must dig beneath the
surface. I begin, then, by exhuming the parties’ briefs on the merits. What is immediately striking
here is that, despite the deep ideological chasm that separated them, AT&T and the Concepcions
were in complete agreement that the outcome of the case hinged on whether the state law
“discriminated” against arbitration.88 Thus, rather than challenge AT&T’s contention that
Discover Bank should be preempted because it “runs afoul of th[e] fundamental
nondiscrimination principle” enshrined in section 2,89 the Concepcions fully embraced it.90 “The
preemption inquiry,” they concurred, “turns on whether the state law in question discriminates
against arbitration.”91 The Concepcions simply disagreed that Discover Bank was discriminatory
in the way that AT&T supposed.92
To be sure, framing the FAA preemption question in this way seems peculiar, perhaps
even jarring. Most of us rightly doubt whether arbitration can be understood as a victim of
“discrimination.” Be that as it may, numerous courts and commentators have appreciated what I
have elsewhere referred to as the equal opportunity underpinnings of the Court’s FAA
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See generally Reuben, supra note 2 (criticizing the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, including Concepcion, as
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symposium, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 26, 2011, 6:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/closing-thoughts-on-thearbitration-symposium/.
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See Aragaki, supra note 50, at 1197.
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See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 28–29, 36–37, 42; Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (No. 09–893) [hereinafter Transcript].
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preemption jurisprudence.93 And for at least a decade, commentators have criticized state
unconscionability rulings using the very same antidiscrimination arguments advanced by AT&T
in Concepcion.94 My point in this Article is not to defend or attack the way in which FAA
preemption doctrine has come to be organized around the idea of antidiscrimination. Instead, it is
to draw attention to the undeniable fact of this organization and how it enables courts to deploy a
potent rhetoric—often in ways that are internally inconsistent or incoherent—to legitimize the
FAA’s extraordinary displacement of state law.95
Surprisingly, few have ventured beyond the occasional, one-line reference to the FAA as
an “anti-discrimination statute”96 or as “a kind of equal protection clause” for arbitration
provisions97 in order to explain the meaning behind those claims. As a result, the
antidiscrimination foundations of federal arbitration law remain to this day poorly understood and
vastly under-theorized.98 This would prove particularly problematic in Concepcion because the
precise antidiscrimination issue raised by AT&T was itself far more complex than what had
previously come before the Court.99 The Court has typically preempted state laws that
purposefully target arbitration—laws that “singl[e] out arbitration provisions for suspect status”
on their face.100 By contrast, the Discover Bank standard seeks only to regulate class waivers. It is
“facially neutral”101 both in the sense that it does not specifically mention arbitration and because
it applies equally to class waivers in arbitration and litigation. The Concepcions argued that this
facial neutrality rendered Discover Bank presumptively nondiscriminatory. AT&T countered that
ostensibly neutral laws may nonetheless be used as a pretext for reviving the old judicial hostility
toward arbitration, and that Discover Bank was a clear example of just that.
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By definition, pretextual discrimination means purposeful discrimination.102 To describe
an ostensibly neutral law as “pretextual” is not simply to claim that it happens to produce
discriminatory results; rather, it is to claim that the law serves as a front for discrimination by
design. Although this nuance appears to have been lost on counsel, it was immediately apparent
to the justices during oral argument. Several of them, for instance, asked for a “test” that could be
used to assess whether Discover Bank was in fact a “subterfuge”—that is, a “facially neutral
contract law defense[] that implicitly discriminate[s] against arbitration.”103 Justice Breyer cut to
the heart of the issue with the following colorful hypothetical:
I would guess it’s like Switzerland having a law saying, we only buy
milk from cows who are in pastures higher than 9,000 feet. That
discriminates against milk from the rest of the continent. But to say we
want cows that have passed the tuberculin test doesn’t. . . . And here,
my impression is—correct me if I am wrong—the class arbitration
exists. It’s . . . not like having a jury trial. You could have it in
arbitration. You can have it in litigation. So where is the 9,000-foot
cow, or whatever it is? Where is the discrimination?104

Although the import of this hypothetical has remained obscure to most commentators,105 it is
made plain once we understand the underlying issue as one of pretext. The hypothetical asks
whether Discover Bank is more like a rule against low altitude milk or more like one against
unpasteurized milk. Both are ostensibly neutral with respect to country of origin, but we suspect
only the former to be a foil for hostility toward foreign milk. Why? Because there are good
reasons to discriminate against unpasteurized milk. By contrast, altitude does not bear even a
prima facie relationship to any valid purpose such as national health. The apparent arbitrariness
of the 9,000 foot rule, in other words, makes it more likely to be motivated by xenophobia.106
These and other exchanges during oral argument, together with the parties’ briefing of the
issues, teed up the Court to resolve one and only one question: Was Discover Bank a pretext—a
cover for intentional and unjustified discrimination against arbitration?107 Although the majority
never uses the word “discrimination” in its holding,108 it effectively answers this question in the
affirmative. It begins by observing that the FAA was enacted to rectify a widespread judicial
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hostility toward arbitration109—a purpose that is just as easily frustrated by state laws that single
out arbitration as by more subtle variants that nevertheless “‘derive their meaning from the fact
that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’”110 It then considers whether Discover Bank can be
distinguished from the following “parade of horribles”: (a) a rule requiring the availability of
judicially monitored discovery in all public and private dispute resolution processes; (b) a rule
requiring use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in such processes; or (c) a rule imposing jury fact
finding in such processes.111 The Court suggests that these facially neutral rules are problematic
not so much because they might end up destroying arbitration, but because we have reason to
suspect that they were specifically “aimed at destroying arbitration.”112 Our suspicions, moreover,
would hardly be “fanciful, since the judicial hostility towards arbitration that prompted the FAA
ha[s] manifested itself in ‘a great variety’ of ‘devices and formulas’ declaring arbitration against
public policy.”113 As an example of a “rationalization” for the first rule, a court could claim with a
straight face that “no consumer would knowingly waive his right to full discovery, as this would
enable companies to hide their wrongdoing.”114 Or, to “help avoid preemption,” the third rule
could be dubbed a requirement to convene “‘a panel of twelve lay arbitrators.’”115 The crux of the
Court’s holding is that Discover Bank is equally suspect because it is indistinguishable from any
of these examples of pretextual discrimination.
Properly understood, Concepcion thus stands for the proposition that Discover Bank
somehow purposefully discriminates against arbitration. Many other commentators both within
and outside of this Symposium have made the same observation, although they often employ the
term “hostility” rather than “discrimination.”116 By locating Concepcion within an
antidiscrimination paradigm, I do not mean to say that the contract and favoritism theories are no
longer relevant. Contract and favoritism are important and enduring themes, not just in federal
arbitration law but also in antidiscrimination theory. But as FAA preemption has increased in
complexity, bringing within its purview not just state laws that single out arbitration but also
those that are facially neutral, the older theories have begun to lose some of their explanatory
power. Courts and litigants have more openly embraced antidiscrimination as an alternative
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paradigm that is both more robust and more nuanced for purposes of addressing these new
challenges.
The basic problem, however, is that there is so far no widely-accepted consensus about
the details of this alternative paradigm. To be sure, the cases are replete with cryptic maxims that
sound in a distinctively antidiscrimination register: “Congress precluded States from singling out
arbitration provisions for suspect status”;117 “the FAA is pre-emptive of state laws hostile to
arbitration”;118 the savings clause does not protect a judicial holding that “rel[ies] on the
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for” a determination of unconscionability.119
The most famous of these is perhaps the following:
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to
enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to
enforce its arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any such state policy
unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an
unequal “footing,” directly contrary to the Act's language and
Congress’ intent.120

Most of us think we know what these maxims mean. We think we know, for example,
how to spot a law that “takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at
issue”121 or that fails to place arbitration agreements on an “equal footing.” But the truth is that
we do not. We have been lulled into a false confidence about the nature, scope, and limits of these
propositions and the legal arguments they can be expected to support. The litigation of
Concepcion is a testament to this, and so it is to this issue that I now turn.

III.

LITIGATING CONCEPCION: THE PERILS OF PROTO-THEORY

The parties’ framing of the FAA preemption issue in terms of whether Discover Bank
“discriminated” against arbitration forced the Court to confront a complex set of questions not
just about the nature of the FAA’s antidiscrimination mandate, but also about the circumstances
in which a facially neutral law can be deemed to discriminate against arbitration by pretext.122
Not surprisingly, the justices surfaced many of these questions during oral argument. But upon
reading the transcript of the argument, it becomes painfully evident that counsel on both sides
lacked the analytic tools and even the vocabulary to engage them on a meaningful level. The
117
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reason for this has less to do with the quality of counsel’s representation—which by all accounts
was first rate and which I do not mean to criticize here—and more to do with the dearth of
conceptual resources available to them for constructing sophisticated antidiscrimination
arguments.
My goal in this Part is to draw attention to and to critique the surprisingly
underdeveloped state of the law in this area by focusing on three central questions that the parties
were unable adequately to address during the litigation of Concepcion. Coming to grips with
these questions will be indispensable if we are to have any hope of mastering the
antidiscrimination theory of FAA preemption.

A. What is the Subject of Discrimination?
One of AT&T’s leading arguments for why Discover Bank discriminated against
arbitration was that, instead of applying across the board to all agreements under the sun, it only
applied to a subset of agreements—namely, consumer contracts that contain class waivers.123 In
other words, the mere fact that some arbitration agreements fall within this subset while a whole
range of other agreements do not (think of pharmaceutical, physician-patient, plumbing,
prenuptial, prostate removal, and countless other agreements) is sufficient to establish
discriminatory treatment. The obvious point that Discover Bank does not treat class waivers in
arbitration any differently from those in litigation recedes into obscurity.
AT&T’s flagship argument that a state law “discriminates” for FAA preemption purposes
if it fails to “‘place[] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts’”124 is,
however, hopelessly incoherent. No law—not even the defense of fraud or duress—applies in any
meaningful sense, as one group of amici put it, to “‘any’ and every contract.”125 More to the point,
the argument betrays a vital misunderstanding about the subject of the FAA’s antidiscrimination
mandate. Most courts and commentators assume that the FAA’s purpose is to make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts. But as I have already argued, making arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts was never an end in itself; rather, it was a means to
enable the arbitration process to stand on an equal footing with litigation.126 At root, therefore, the
subject of the FAA’s mandate must be the latter and not the former.
A simple example from the antidiscrimination context will explain. The claim that a
prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenge to exclude African Americans from petit criminal
juries violates the Equal Protection Clause is at root a claim that eligible African Americans are
being discriminated against in favor of a comparison group. The comparison group plainly cannot
consist of all other individuals, for the peremptory challenge is inapplicable to whole classes of
persons (non-citizen permanent residents, children, convicted felons in custody, persons who
123
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have served in the past twelve months, and residents of other states, to name a few). Yet this lack
of universal applicability hardly shakes our confidence in the prosecutor’s evenhanded use of the
challenge. What is relevant is only whether, given two or more groups whose members are
functionally interchangeable in the sense that each could perform jury service in the same way,
one is being disfavored for no reason other than race.127 Thus, one way of raising an inference of
race-based discrimination would be to show that the prosecutor used his peremptories more
frequently against eligible African Americans than he did against eligible whites.128
Now consider three different contract clauses: (i) an arbitration clause containing a class
arbitration waiver, (ii) an attorney fee-shifting clause, and (iii) a release of liability clause. Like
the prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenge in my example, Discover Bank arguably has an
adverse effect only on the arbitration clause; it has no application whatsoever to the other two or
indeed to most other contract clauses. But the fact that Discover Bank does not apply in this way
to “all” clauses is surely not what it means for Discover Bank to discriminate. We do not suspect,
for instance, that the California Supreme Court devised the Discover Bank standard in order to
enable more attorney fee-shifting clauses to be enforced or to encourage contract drafters to
include more releases in their form contracts. Striking the arbitration clause as unconscionable
does not somehow favor the other two clauses in the way that excluding eligible African
Americans from jury service favors eligible whites. The reason is that the other clauses are not
functionally interchangeable with the arbitration clause and thereby provide no salient
comparison group for purposes of establishing discrimination.
To the extent that the facially neutral Discover Bank rule can be considered
discriminatory at all, therefore, it must be because the rule treats arbitration and litigation
differently for essentially arbitrary reasons—reasons that we suspect derive from the common
law’s legacy of “jealousy” toward the arbitral forum.129 This makes eminent sense not just as a
matter of logic but also in light of the history of Anglo-American arbitration law. The central
question that flows through that history—from Scott v. Avery130 to Tobey v. Bristol131 to Wilko v.
Swan132 and finally, I argue, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion—is the question of whether arbitration
and litigation are functionally equivalent dispute resolution forums, not whether arbitration
agreements are or should be interchangeable with other contracts.
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Despite what may in hindsight appear to be a fairly obvious point, FAA preemption
doctrine continues to exhibit a bewildering indecisiveness about something as foundational as the
subject of its antidiscrimination principle. Consider that the essentially specious “all contracts”
ratio has for more than ten years been the leading standard used by lower courts to determine
whether facially neutral laws other than standard contract law defenses are preempted by the
FAA.133 The confusion is so widespread and unquestioned that not even AT&T saw through it
clearly. If it had, it surely would not have led with an argument that even justices who joined the
majority dismissed as a non-starter.134 Instead, AT&T would have focused its efforts on
developing an argument that was still inchoate in its brief but that eventually carried the day: the
claim that Discover Bank, like the Court’s parade of horribles, is tainted by the impermissible
“assumption that arbitration cannot vindicate the public interest to the same extent as judicial
class actions.”135
Confusion about the subject of discrimination is problematic not simply because it breeds
imprecision or inconsistency but because it tempts obfuscation. When courts mobilize the rhetoric
of antidiscrimination to justify preempting state laws without being clear about the very subject of
their purported solicitude, the resulting lack of transparency can be exploited to reach resultdriven decisions. Consider a forum selection statute, facially neutral in the way I describe
above,136 that voids any agreement by persons with little or no bargaining power (e.g., a
franchisee or consumer) to resolve disputes outside her home state. The overwhelming majority
of courts hold that such laws violate the maxim to place arbitration agreements on an “equal
footing with all other contracts”137 because the laws apply (i) only to forum selection clauses in
(ii) only one type of contract (e.g., franchise, consumer).138 What gets occluded by this analysis,
of course, is that those laws still treat arbitration and litigation exactly the same.139
When the tables are turned, however, precisely the opposite argument is invoked. Thus,
when the law at issue is a common law defense that (according to FAA lore) applies to all
133
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contracts, those seeking preemption argue that the law “rests on nothing less than an assumption
that arbitration, just because it is arbitration, is less desirable than litigation.”140 In other words,
when it is no longer feasible to claim that arbitration agreements have been placed on a different
footing than other contracts, the axis of comparison switches to arbitration vs. litigation. “Heads
we win, tails you lose.”

B.

Is Discrimination Equivalent to Doctrinal Deviation?

AT&T’s other leading argument was that Discover Bank discriminated against arbitration
because it represented such a “distortion” of California unconscionability doctrine that “[w]e have
not located a single precedential California decision” to support it.141 The gravamen of this claim
is not that Discover Bank merely extends or adapts the doctrine in questionable ways—ways that
a reviewing court would leave undisturbed.142 Instead, it is that Discover Bank is unprecedented
and erroneous as a matter of law, among other things because it considers the fairness of a clause
(i) to persons who are not parties to the agreement and (ii) in light of subsquent events, rather
than events at the time of contracting.143 These “significant” and “extreme” doctrinal
“deviat[ions]”144 from settled unconscionability principles, AT&T argued, are sufficient to
“demonstrate[] impermissible discrimination.”145
But a moment’s thought should reveal that there is no necessary connection between
discrimination and doctrinal error. Incorrect applications of the law may well be considered
nondiscriminatory, as when laws are misapplied because of incompetence, oversight, or a selfconfessed desire to further other, more important ends. And depending on how discrimination is
defined, even incorrect applications that produce starkly disproportionate outcomes, if
unaccompanied by improper motives, may not count as discriminatory.146
By the same token, correct applications of the law may well be discriminatory. A good
example of this is Batson v. Kentucky,147 the inspiration for my previous example involving the
140
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peremptory challenge. The gist of Mr. Batson’s equal protection claim was not that the prosecutor
had exercised his preremptories incorrectly (for example, because he had used too many). Quite
the contrary: It was that it is virtually impossible for the prosecutor to do so, which is precisely
what makes the discrimination so difficult to prove. If Mr. Batson had been required to establish
an error of state law before he could establish his federal constitutional claim, equal protection
law would entirely fail to capture much of what we consider pretextual discrimination. By
overlooking this hallmark of a claim sounding in pretext—namely, the use of something
legitimate to cover something illegitimate—AT&T underappreciated the crux of its own pretextbased claim.
Equipped with a more sophisticated account of discrimination under the FAA, AT&T
might have marshaled a much stronger argument: Even if Discover Bank were a perfectly valid
application or “refinement” of longstanding unconscionability principles (as the Concepcions and
their amici had contended), it was still discriminatory and thus preempted.148 The argument was
hardly beyond contemplation. A loud chorus of courts and commentators has increasingly warned
that unconscionability is being used as a ruse for a “new judicial hostility” toward arbitration.149
In its strongest form, the contention is not so much that courts are getting the law of
unconscionability wrong (even though, for want of a better alternative, this is indeed how many
have framed it).150 Instead, it is that the absence of bright line rules in the unconscionability area
allows them to get it right and thereby to perpetuate the legacy of anti-arbitration hostility in ways
that escape easy detection.151
Using doctrinal deviation as a proxy for discrimination did not just prevent AT&T from
advancing much stronger arguments. Crucially, it also collapsed the federal preemption inquiry
into a question of state contract law.152 This effectively put AT&T in the odious position of
asking the Court to review the California Supreme Court’s Discover Bank decision on the
merits—a request that even AT&T must have realized was deeply problematic from a federalism
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perspective.153 The fact that AT&T persisted with the argument all the same speaks volumes
about the reigning confusion over what it means to “discriminate” for purposes of FAA
preemption.
Here one might reasonably ask how AT&T and others who fear the pretextual use of the
unconscionability doctrine can prove discrimination without the crutch of doctrinal
misapplication. An answer is suggested by a distinctive characteristic of pretext claims that we
considered earlier: They presuppose intentional discriminatory treatment. As such, it should be
possible to demonstrate that an adverse unconscionability determination, even if doctrinally
unremarkable, was nonetheless motivated by impermissible hostility to arbitration.154 For
instance, a court might enunciate the familiar unconscionability rule yet apply it in a way that
betrays “outmoded presumptions” about arbitration’s inferiority to litigation.155 A court might
also drop other hints in its opinion that suggest a visceral rather than reasoned opposition to
arbitration.156 A good example of the former is the California Supreme Court’s much-discussed
opinion in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.157 Armendariz raises far
fewer doctrinal red flags than Discover Bank. But because the holding in Armendariz rests in part
on questionable assumptions about arbitration’s competence and desirability as a dispute
resolution forum, it is arguably beset by the same anti-arbitration hostility prohibited by the
FAA.158
A final retort is that doctrinal irregularities and departures from the ordinary course,
without more, are sometimes sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination.159 Although this is
certainly true, AT&T was not making this much more subtle point. Even if it were, it failed to
offer persuasive reasons for drawing such an inference in the case of Discover Bank. In particular,
it did not even attempt to explain how and why the doctrinal deviations it identified might be
indicative of hostility specifically toward arbitration rather than toward class waivers.160 Recall
that Discover Bank does not apply only to arbitration clauses or even to all arbitration clauses; its
153
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real target is class waivers in consumer contracts. Thus, even when Discover Bank is used to void
such a waiver, there are no necessary ramifications for the promise to arbitrate because courts
may still order the case to class arbitration (as many have).161 Moreover, Discover Bank imposes
the identical restriction on class waivers in the litigation process. Something more is therefore
needed to support the conclusion that Discover Bank’s irregularities (if any) “express the
impermissible view that arbitration is inferior to litigation.”162 Doctrinal departures alone do not
get us there.

C. Purpose- or Effects-Based Discrimination?
Mature antidiscrimination theories broadly recognize the distinction between intent-based
and impact-based discrimination, and they make a self-conscious choice to rectify one or the
other (or sometimes both). For instance, the heightened scrutiny afforded to suspect and quasisuspect classes under the Equal Protection Clause requires proof of invidious purpose; the mere
fact that the law’s impact “may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to
the more affluent white”163 is insufficient. By contrast, reasonable accommodation claims and
statutory “disparate impact” claims seek to rectify more than purposeful discrimination. They
therefore require no proof of intent; the only relevant question is whether a particular measure
produces a certain type or degree of unequal outcome.164
In the FAA context there has been comparatively little if any consideration of whether the
FAA’s antidiscrimination principle is aimed at remedying the law’s purposeful disparate
treatment of arbitration or merely its unintended effects on arbitration. Courts and commentators
routinely blur this distinction, as a result of which the all-important question of just what must be
proven to establish discrimination has remained largely unasked and unanswered.
This basic ambiguity about whether the FAA represents a purpose- or effects-based
antidiscrimination regime haunted the litigation of Concepcion from start to finish. Justice Kagan
put her finger on it during oral argument, when she pointedly asked counsel whether the test for
discrimination under the FAA was “a purpose test or an effects test.” That is, “[i]s it a test that
says the State is doing this in order to kill arbitration, or is it a test that says the State is doing
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something that will kill arbitration?”165 What is striking as one reads the transcript of oral
argument is that counsel did not appear to have the first idea about how to answer this question.
The state of confusion surrounding this critical issue, in turn, had strategic consequences for both
parties.
For example, in response to Justice Kagan’s question, counsel for the Concepcions stated
that “I think you can look to both.”166 In other words, either purpose or effects might be
sufficient, which is the same as saying that proof of discriminatory purpose is strictly
unnecessary. As the party resisting the charge of discrimination, however, the Concepcions
should have argued precisely the opposite. Discriminatory intent, after all, is extremely difficult
to establish because it must almost always be inferred from circumstantial evidence.167 By
following this strategy, the Concepcions would have put AT&T to the test of proving not just that
class-wide relief happens to place intolerable burdens on arbitration, but that the California
Supreme Court willed those burdens when it issued its ruling back in 2005—a time, moreover,
when class arbitration did not seem especially antithetical to arbitration.168
But the Concepcions did not adopt this strategy even though it was perfectly viable given
the way the Court and AT&T had characterized Discover Bank as a pretext.169 At best, the
Concepcions seemed hazy, sometimes arguing that Discover Bank should avoid preemption
because it was not “aimed at destroying arbitration”170 and at other times contending that the mere
fact that it destroys arbitration was sufficient.171 At worst, they affirmatively endorsed an effectsbased paradigm. This surfaced most clearly in the Concepcions’ attempts to distinguish Discover
Bank from AT&T’s parade of horribles. In their brief, the Concepcions argued that the latter were
preempted because they “demand[ed] procedures incompatible with arbitration” and would

165
Transcript, supra note 88, at 49; see also id. at 17 (Kagan, J.); id. at 35–36 (Sotomayor, J.) (“I don’t want to
look through legislative history and determine whether some committee person said something that sounds like
subterfuge. How do I look at the law and its effects and determine that subterfuge or that discrimination?”); id. at 48
(Breyer, J.) (“What do I look to? It’s not logic . . . . [W]hat should I read to show, in your opinion, you’re right?”).
166
See Transcript, supra note 88, at 49.
167
See, e.g., Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987); Ralph Richard Banks & Richard
Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053,
1074 (2009).
168
Consider that Discover Bank was handed down less than two years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003)—widely interpreted as donning implicit approval to class
arbitration—and five years before Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010),
where the Court first suggested that class arbitration might not even be arbitration at all. In large part because of the
Bazzle decision, the AAA and a number of other arbitration providers developed class arbitration rules. See Brief of
American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9–12, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2009) (No. 08–1198).
169
See supra notes 101–115 and accompanying text. Moreover, as I have elsewhere argued, the best
interpretation of the Court’s FAA jurisprudence is that only purpose-based discrimination is prohibited. See Aragaki,
supra note 50, at 1210–18 (distinguishing between formal and fair equality of opportunity).
170
Brief for Respondents, supra note 91, at 32; see also Transcript, supra note 88, at 48–51.
171
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, supra note 91, at 11 (arguing that the FAA does not permit states to impose
procedures that are “fundamentally incompatible” with arbitration); id. at 32–35; Transcript, supra note 88, at 38–39
(arguing that the test is whether the state law is “tantamount to a rule of non-enforceability of arbitration agreements”);
id. at 47–48 (arguing that the hypothetical laws discriminate because of their “systematic effect[s]”); id. at 49.

63

thereby end up “destroy[ing]” the FAA unless they were preempted.172 Likewise, they suggested
that the problem with the ouster rule (which they assimilated to the parade of horribles) was its
“discriminatory effect[s]” on arbitration173 rather than, as is commonly supposed, the antiarbitration motives behind those effects.174 By focusing on effects at the expense of purpose, these
arguments reduced the resolution of the case to one of simple line-drawing: Does Discover Bank
burden arbitration to quite the same degree as the parade of horribles? Ironically, it was the
Concepcions’ own framing of the issue in this way that led an exasperated Justice Alito to foretell
the outcome of the case in this exchange with the Concepcions’ counsel during oral argument:
What is the difference . . . between a rule that says you must follow the
rules of evidence in every adjudication and a rule that says that class
adjudication must always be available? I think your answer comes
down to the proposition that the former is inconsistent with the idea of
arbitration, and therefore, that’s why it’s not allowed, and the latter is
not inconsistent with the idea of arbitration, and therefore, it is
allowed. . . . [I]n the end . . . . we have to make a value judgment about
whether these things, one thing or the other, fits with arbitration. That’s
what it comes down to.175

For its part, AT&T appeared just as confused as the Concepcions about the
purpose/effects distinction and its importance to the outcome of the case. AT&T took the state of
California to task for intentionally targeting arbitration, not for devising well-meaning rules that
unexpectedly interfered with the enforceability of arbitration agreements.176 The ostensibly
“even-handed” Discover Bank rule, in its view, was “gerrymandered to target arbitration
provisions,”177 “devise[d]” to encumber arbitration with all the accoutrements of litigation,178
“aimed directly at agreements to resolve disputes—[which] almost invariably [means] arbitration
agreements,”179 and for these reasons “resuscitat[es] . . . judicial hostility to arbitration.”180
Similarly, when comparing Discover Bank to the parade of horribles, AT&T suggested that the
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problem with the latter was the bad motives they betrayed rather than their destructive effect on
arbitration.181
A far easier and more direct route to proving discrimination would have been to piggy
back on the Concepcions’ argument by contending that Discover Bank’s devastating effect on
arbitration, without more, was sufficient to prove discrimination.182 This was certainly a plausible
contention.183 AT&T was moreover astute enough to realize that Justice Scalia, at least, would
have been receptive to it given the tenor of his questions during oral argument in Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,184 the other High Court case to address class arbitration. There, he
asked: “Why isn’t the Federal Arbitration Act more reasonably interpreted as directed at those
State laws that . . . are destructive of arbitration, that . . . are hostile not in the sense of any . . .
mental intent, but that in their operation make it difficult for parties to enter into arbitration
agreements?”185 Sure enough, the majority’s opinion—authored by none other than Justice
Scalia—adopted precisely this effects-based standard.186 For rather than attempt to determine
whether Discover Bank, like the hypothetical laws in the parade of horribles, disguised a purpose
to discriminate, the majority characterized those laws as “fundamentally incompatible” with
arbitration and simply asked whether Discover Bank was likewise incompatible.

IV.

THE MAJORITY’S REASONING: A CRITIQUE AND RECONSTRUCTION

The parties’ above-described handicaps in presenting persuasive accounts of what makes
Discover Bank discriminatory (or not) for FAA preemption purposes left the Court largely to its
own devices when deciding the case. Notably, even though it agreed with the result advocated by
181

Id. at 50 (describing the parade of horribles as evincing a “concern[] that traditional arbitration hinders parties
situated similarly to the plaintiff from learning of infringements of their legal rights,” or a “convi[ction] of the
superiority of jury trials”). Likewise, AT&T’s amici argued that Discover Bank and other California unconscionability
precedents evince a purpose to “target arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment.” Brief Amici Curiae of
Distinguished Law Professors, supra note 31, at 10.
182
To be sure, AT&T argued in passing that Discover Bank had a disparate “impact” on arbitration because it had
the “effect . . . [of] transfor[ming] arbitration in the ways the Court described in Stolt Nielsen.” Transcript, supra note
88, at 10; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 21, 30–31. But these remarks were so understated that they
sound more like afterthoughts or arguments made for the sake of completeness. It is moreover unclear whether AT&T
meant to say that these disparate impacts are important for drawing an inference of intentional discrimination or
whether they are sufficiently actionable in themselves. For instance, AT&T argued that Discover Bank’s disparate
impact on arbitration would “as a practical matter allow use of ‘the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis
for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.’” Id. at 30–31. Because a state would only consider
the uniqueness of an arbitration agreement if it intended to target arbitration, the argument suggests that impacts are
simply a means of establishing intent.
183
In unsuccessful certiorari petitions filed in similar cases, AT&T’s counsel Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP
advanced precisely this type of effects-based argument for FAA preemption. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 15–16, Cingular Wireless LLC v. Mendoza, 547 U.S. 1188 (2006) (No. 05–1119). The majority opinion in
Concepcion not only ends up adopting an effects-based discrimination test, its declarations about the incompatibility
between collective actions and the arbitration process also read as if they had been lifted straight from the arguments
made by Mayer Brown in these unsuccessful certiorari petitions.
184
539 U.S. 444 (2003).
185
Transcript of Oral Argument at 53 (Scalia, J.), Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (No. 02–
634).
186
Accord Marks, supra note 77, at 43–44.

65

AT&T, the majority did not incorporate or rely on any of AT&T’s leading arguments.187 Instead,
it held that Discover Bank discriminated against arbitration because the rule imposed a procedure
that had the effect of destroying arbitration.
In this Part, I argue that the Court’s adoption of an effects-based standard of
discrimination—and, more importantly, its reliance on essentialism to vindicate that standard—
was a mistake for reasons that extend far beyond the confines of this particular case. I then argue
that the Court should have stayed true to its longstanding position that the FAA was enacted to
reverse the “‘old judicial law hostility to arbitration’”188 by asking whether Discover Bank
evinced a discriminatory purpose.

A. The Causes and Consequences of Essentialism
A keystone of the Court’s holding in Concepcion is the assertion that class arbitration is
not really “arbitration.” Class-wide relief, we are told, produces a “structural” change that
“interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration.”189 Class arbitration is time consuming,
formalistic, and procedurally complex—all the things that arbitration under the FAA is neither
supposed to be nor likely can be. These and similar claims in the Court’s decision are problematic
not so much because they are empirically dubious190 as because they unnecessarily essentialize
arbitration: They purport to identify, once and for all, certain constitutive or definitional features
of the arbitral process.
It may be tempting here to think of this essentialism as following inescapably from the
Court’s decision one year earlier in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International.191 There, the
Court opined that class proceedings were inconsistent with the very “nature of arbitration,” such
that the shift from bilateral to class-wide arbitration would change the arbitral process in
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“fundamental” ways.192 These sweeping pronouncements likely informed the majority’s analysis
in Concepcion. But as others have noted, they did not preordain that analysis.193
An alternative or perhaps more compelling explanation for Concepcion’s essentialism is
that it helps establish that arbitration and litigation are differently situated, such that treating them
exactly the same (as Discover Bank does) amounts to a type of discrimination.194 Using the FAA
to preempt Discover Bank then begins to look perfectly consistent with the goal of
nondiscrimination, because it effectively allows the two forums to be treated differently in ways
that reflect their essential differences.195 From this standpoint, Concepcion appears simply to
reaffirm the principle that “[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that
are different as though they were exactly alike.”196 If this is, in fact, the underlying logic of the
majority’s reasoning in Concepcion, then it is a very complex logic indeed, one that raises more
questions than it answers and one whose consequences must be carefully considered.
It may be helpful here to look at how claims of equality predicated on the need for
differential treatment—rather than on the default rule of similar treatment—have played out in
more traditional antidiscrimination contexts. The dominant paradigm of American
antidiscrimination law perceives the wrong of discrimination in terms of a failure to recognize our
inherent sameness across race, gender, and other status-based categories.197 It constructs a world
in which men and women are presumed to have the same ability to become, say, firefighters or
care givers; a world in which African-Americans and whites are presumed interchangeable for
purposes of becoming office managers or jurors.198 Status-based differences are thereby rendered
irrelevant; what matters is simply the individual’s functional capacity to perform the task at
hand.199
As intuitively appealing as it is in form, however, this “sameness” model is potentially
problematic because it overlooks real and unavoidable differences between groups. Gender
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presents an especially salient context in which “innate physical differences between the sexes”200
are such that treating men and women the same may sometimes be intolerable or, worse,
impossible.201 For example, the Court has relied on the biological fact that only women bear
children in order to uphold state statutes that treat unwed mothers and fathers differently when it
comes to parental rights.202 It has also upheld the exclusion of women from such things as the
draft and liability for statutory rape because of supposed “fundamental” and “physiological”
differences between the sexes in matters relating to military combat and sexual predation.203
Many feminists supported these decisions. They argued that even if the decisions rested
on gender-based stereotypes, those stereotypes were often overwhelmingly accurate: Women do,
in fact, take primary responsibility for the nurture and care of children (often at great sacrifice to
their own professional advancement), and they are statistically far more likely than males to be
victims of physical and sexual aggression.204 Some feminists also warned that by demanding
similar treatment to men in these contexts, women would on a deeper level risk “betraying
[them]selves and supporting what [they] find least acceptable about the male world.”205 These
arguments reflected a growing consciousness of women’s unique and “different voice,” one
200
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grounded in an ethic of care and relationship as contrasted with a (perceived) male ethic of
aggression and individualism.206 This consciousness, in turn, led women to envision a nonassimilationist, “difference theory” of equality, one that did not require women to become like
men in order to be equal to them.207
By taking the position that arbitration and litigation are inherently different for purposes
of class-wide relief, Concepcion traces its pedigree to something like the difference theory. From
this perspective, it represents a more evolved state of thinking about the FAA’s antidiscrimination
mandate because it avoids the facile presumption that arbitration and litigation must always be
treated the same in order to be placed on an “equal footing.” But Concepcion is also problematic
because it reifies differences that are arguably contingent and mutable. This, in turn, exposes it to
the same critique of essentialism that has long been the Achilles’ heel of difference theory.208
Thus, many feminists have argued that the Court’s more recent, difference-based equal
protection cases—even those that favor women by exempting them from requirements otherwise
applicable to men—are in truth scarcely distinguishable from paternalistic decisions from the turn
of the century that rested on deeply suspicious stereotypes about the ‘fairer sex.’209 Clearest
among these were early cases that restricted women’s choices in the world of work—a world
traditionally dominated by men. In Muller v. Oregon,210 for instance, the Court upheld a statute
making it a crime to employ women (but not men) in certain establishments for more than ten
hours per day, even if the women wished to work longer. The rationale was that a woman’s
“physical organization,” “maternal functions,” and role in child rearing and “the maintenance of
the home” placed her in a position “inherent[ly] differen[t]” from that of a man.211 Only in more
recent times would the Court come to appreciate the way that Muller and cases like it used the
supposedly inexorable dictates of biology to legitimize arrangements that are now recognized as
socially and historically contingent.212
Not unlike what it did in Muller, in Concepcion the Court locates arbitration’s principal
virtue over litigation in terms of “achiev[ing] ‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious
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results,’”213 and professes to protect that virtue from perceived threats such as Discover Bank. But
it is precisely the notion that arbitration has a fixed telos waiting to be discovered that is so
dangerously susceptible to abuse. Consider Wilko v. Swan,214 a case that those who support
Concepcion tend to consider a low point in the history of federal arbitration law. In words
strikingly evocative of Concepcion, the Court in Wilko held that arbitration’s primary
“advantage[]” in “secur[ing] prompt, economical and adequate” decisions made it
correspondingly unsuited to decide weighty and complicated issues under the federal securities
laws.215 Similarly, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,216 the Court opined that “it is the informality
of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious
means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less
appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts.”217
These status-based judgments “centered on the nature of arbitration”218 have been used
time and again to justify invalidating broadly worded arbitration agreements.219 They also fuel the
claims of some of arbitration’s fiercest critics: “[T]here is inherent in the institutions of private
dispute resolution an endemic disinclination to enforce legal rights rigorously”;220 there is a “total
lack of procedural safeguards inherent in the arbitration process”;221 “[n]ow we all know, that
arbitrators . . . . are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity, to
administer either effectually, in complicated cases.”222 By resurrecting similar generalizations
about arbitration’s essence—generalizations that are likely no longer even empirically
accurate223—Concepcion is a case study in how easily the (otherwise legitimate) concern for
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difference can be co-opted in ways that undermine rather than support the goal of
nondiscrimination.224
Concepcion’s essentialism is further problematic because it reinforces what in the gender
context has been described as a “separate spheres ideology.”225 Men and women are so
ineluctably different, the argument goes, that they can be equal only in their separate and
mutually exclusive realms. The answer to man’s domination in the sphere of work or politics is
therefore not to make woman an equal participant in the same sphere, but rather to give her
dominion over an entirely different sphere—that of the hearth and home.226 To merge the spheres
would so upset the essential order of things that women would stop marrying and procreating, and
the species would face imminent extinction.227 The almost apocalyptic fear behind these
contentions is of a piece with the fear of racial amalgamation that lies barely concealed beneath
the surface of Plessy v. Ferguson.228 In both contexts, separateness is used to justify equality in
form but subordination in substance.229
This same amalgamation anxiety animates Concepcion. It is evident, for instance, in the
Court’s suggestion that once states are permitted to make class-wide relief non-waivable in
arbitration, it is a short step to state laws that require arbitration proceedings to incorporate jury
fact finding or judicially monitored discovery.230 It drives AT&T’s prediction that unless
Discover Bank were preempted as to class arbitration waivers, states could “‘chip away at [the
FAA] by indirection,’” and thereby “kill arbitration by converting it into litigation.”231 And it is
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latent in other recent decisions from the Court, such as Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,232 that
seek to enforce a clear boundary between the respective provinces of arbitral and judicial
proceedings.233
To be sure, there are compelling policy reasons for advocating a “separate but equal”
approach in the arbitration area in a way that does not obtain in the context of race. No matter
what we believe (or are told by the Court to believe) about arbitration’s capacity to function as a
surrogate for litigation in the vast majority of civil cases, there are certain undeniable
architectural differences between the two forums—differences that make it impossible for
arbitration to function in all the ways that a court of law can (and vice versa).234 The point is just
that what we take to be “real” differences are not ideologically neutral but are more often than not
self-fulfilling.235 Care must therefore be taken before using essentialism to justify exceptionalism.
As just one example of this danger, consider the way in which the Court manages to
exaggerate the differences between litigation and arbitration by eliding the extent to which
collective actions are arguably just as incompatible with the former as they are with the latter.236
For example, the rigorous requirements for class certification237 reflect a judgment that not all
litigated cases are suitable for class-wide relief (and for exactly the same reasons of complexity,
delay, and absent third parties that Concepcion identified in the context of arbitration).238 This
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judgment is borne out by extant (but admittedly sparse) empirical data suggesting that well below
half of all putative class actions are certified.239 In language reminiscent of Concepcion, scholars
such as Martin Redish have claimed that “all class action models . . . should be rejected because
they ignore, undermine, or dilute fundamental notions of process-based individual autonomy that
are essential to the functioning of a civil justice system.”240 Likewise, when the 1966 revisions to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were issued, many viewed them as doing “more
to change the face of federal practice than any other procedural development of the twentieth
century, including the promulgation of the Civil Rules in 1938.” 241 As in Concepcion, the fear
was that class actions would make “litigation so complex as to be beyond the power of judicial
tribunals to adjudicate on any rational basis.”242 By showcasing the way that class-wide relief
conflicts with arbitration while suppressing the way in which it is likewise incompatible with
litigation, therefore, the Court manages to invent differences that are not necessary or
unavoidable. This, in turn, downplays the important ways in which the two adjudicative forums
are the same and thus the reasons why they should be regulated accordingly.
Once we commit ourselves to Concepcion’s premise that certain things commonly
associated with litigation such as the class mechanism or the Federal Rules of Evidence frustrate
the essence of arbitration, it seems to me we must now begin to re-evaluate many things that we
previously took for granted. For example, the state of Illinois requires that in certain
circumstances, the “Rules of Evidence that apply in the circuit court for placing medical opinions
into evidence shall govern” in motor vehicle insurance coverage arbitrations.243 California deems
239
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incorporated into every agreement to arbitrate wrongful death or injury claims “a right to take
depositions and to obtain discovery” in the same manner and to the same extent available in a
comparable action pending before a superior court.244 Some regulatory bodies, trade associations,
and dispute resolution providers not only prohibit waivers of, but affirmatively require, certain
procedural protections similar (but not identical) to what might be found in litigation, such as (a)
a right to discovery,245 (b) a right to file a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment,246 (c) a right of appeal to an appellate arbitration panel,247 (d) a right to peremptory and
cause-based challenges to appointed arbitrators,248 (e) a right to permissive joinder and
consolidation,249 and (f) a right to written, publicly available awards.250 These are all examples of
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imposing litigation-like procedures in arbitration—procedures that, after Concepcion, appear just
as incompatible with arbitration as does the class mechanism.251 Are they likewise preempted or
otherwise displaced by the FAA?
A similar set of questions arises when, over the objection of one side, an arbitrator relies
on state or federal rules of evidence or procedure in a way that affects the outcome of a case.252 If
the imposition of such rules of decision is fundamentally incompatible with the arbitration
process after Concepcion, may the disappointed party now successfully argue for vacatur of the
resulting award on the ground that the arbitrator has “exceed [her] powers” or violated (federal)
public policy?253
These are serious and viable questions in a post-Concepcion world. If rules that operate
to ensure fairness in the default context of litigation conflict with the very definition of
arbitration, then efforts to regulate procedural fairness in arbitration (whether by states, private
regulatory bodies, or arbitrators themselves) that are modeled on such rules will be prone to
attack as underhanded attempts to conform arbitration to litigation’s image. Courts will
increasingly use FAA preemption as an excuse to exempt arbitration from rules such as Discover
Bank while continuing to enforce those rules in the litigation context. Efforts to uphold the same
minimum standards in both forums will thereby be stymied. This perpetuates the very
discrimination that the Court claims it seeks to eradicate because it reinforces arbitration’s
separate sphere—a sphere in which the usual standards of fairness do not apply (and, after
Concepcion, cannot apply without destroying the very nature of arbitration under the FAA).
Now consider the problem presented by the opposite of Discover Bank—laws that forbid
rather than impose class arbitration, or that prohibit rather than require use of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Such laws would upset the contractual expectations of parties who currently
incorporate all manner of litigation-like rules and procedures into their arbitration agreements: not
just class-wide relief,254 but also appellate review,255 comprehensive discovery,256 the federal rules
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of evidence257 and even the federal rules of civil procedure.258 The Court has emphasized time
and again that “[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”259 The FAA should
therefore preempt state laws that seek to curtail that freedom of contract. But after Concepcion, it
is difficult to appreciate how a law that merely forbids the very things that the Court believes are
fundamentally incompatible with arbitration’s true nature can possibly frustrate the FAA’s
purpose.
This second set of examples highlights the way in which the Court’s preoccupation with
arbitration’s status belies its purported fealty to freedom of contract in matters arbitration. Just as
Muller restricted women’s choices in the sphere of employment, so Concepcion threatens one of
the cardinal virtues of arbitration: the freedom it affords in the design of a disputing process.
Modern arbitration law has largely been organized around vindicating this freedom by enabling
arbitration to become whatever the contracting parties agreed it would become—even if this
means it might never become anything at all.260 By contrast, Concepcion returns arbitration to the
yoke of status. It implies that an agreement audacious enough to contemplate inefficient and
complex class procedures does not deserve the FAA’s protection.261 Freedom of contract and
favoritism toward arbitration, in other words, are ultimately qualified—they are to be pursued
only in the name of a particular conception of arbitration as a quick and dirty version of litigation.
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B.

The Touchstone of Intentional Discrimination

My goal in the prior section was to explain Concepcion’s essentialism as a classic
antidiscrimination move, one that nonetheless comes with significant and well-known costs that
our experience in the gender discrimination context suggests are not worth paying. In this section,
I seek to show that these costs did not need to be (and should not have been) paid in the first
place.
The Court used essentialism to answer the question of how we tell whether a facially
neutral law “discriminates” against arbitration. It was led down this path, however, only because
it mistakenly ended up focusing on “disproportionate impact” as the touchstone for
discrimination262—that is, on Discover Bank’s de facto unequal treatment of arbitration and
litigation in the way that it imposes on both forums a procedure that is fundamentally
incompatible only with the former. This overlooks a much more compelling alternative, which
was to focus on whether California’s context-specific unconscionability rule constituted de jure
discrimination. Doing so would have forced the Court to make good on its own claim that
Discover Bank exhibits the same “judicial hostility towards arbitration that prompted the FAA
[and that] had manifested itself in ‘a great variety’ of ‘devices and formulas’ declaring arbitration
against public policy.”263
Hostility is not a word we associate with chance. To say that a law or employment
practice is “hostile” toward a particular group is to say that it was motivated—however
subliminally—by a purpose to discriminate.264 Thus, if we are to take seriously the Court’s
longstanding position that the FAA was enacted to reverse the “old common law hostility toward
arbitration,”265 it follows that the FAA should be construed to preempt only state laws that are
intentionally anti-arbitration.266 This is consistent with AT&T’s framing of the preemption issue
in terms of pretext and with the Court’s own discussion of Discover Bank and the parade of
horribles.267 Federal arbitration law, in short, represents a purpose-based antidiscrimination
regime.268 This interpretation is not only more faithful to the Court’s accumulated FAA
jurisprudence, it is also more sensible from a federalism perspective. Because proving
discriminatory purpose is exceptionally difficult, intent-based antidiscrimination regimes afford
less protection than their effects-based counterparts.269 In the arbitration context, this means that
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fewer claims of discrimination against arbitration will survive, and thus that fewer state laws will
suffer preemption.270
By declaring that class arbitration is incompatible with arbitration’s true nature, the Court
managed to find a colorable ground for conflict with the FAA without delving into the messier
question of whether that conflict was haphazard or the product of improper motives. For if a state
law can be described as striking at the essence of arbitration, it does not seem to matter much
whether it does so through hostility or by accident. In either case, the FAA’s purposes and
objectives would appear to be quite clearly frustrated. But notice that the reason why they are
frustrated has now changed: It is no longer that the state law in question functions as a pretext,
perpetuating anti-arbitration policies behind the guise of a facially neutral regulation, as AT&T
had originally claimed. Instead, it is that the law—however well-intentioned toward arbitration—
has managed to turn arbitration into something that it plainly is not.271
Had the requirement to prove purposeful discrimination been better appreciated by the
litigants and the Court, it would have provided a clean and simple way to distinguish Discover
Bank from AT&T’s parade of horribles. These hypothetical laws are problematic not because
they just happen to produce disparate impacts on arbitration. Rather, they are problematic because
we suspect them to be predicated on little more than knee-jerk litigation chauvinism: the bare
assumption that only the judicial forum—or features designed for that forum or otherwise unique
to it, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence and jury fact-finding—is adequate to resolve certain
types of consumer claims.272
In order to analogize Discover Bank to these examples, it would need to be fairly evident
that Discover Bank likewise purposefully discriminates against arbitration. But even if it could be
taken to “impose” class arbitration,273 Discover Bank does not dictate the particular form that such
a procedure must take. It does not, for instance, require the wholesale importation of judicial class
action rules and procedures such as Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the
arbitration context, and so does not betray the same type of chauvinism evident in the parade of
horribles. The most that can be said about Discover Bank is that it mandates the availability of
some type of class mechanism (and then only if the Concepcions could satisfy the requirements
270
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for class certification). Because the parties had agreed to arbitrate before the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), that mechanism would have conformed to the AAA’s class
arbitration rules.274 But it did not need to. AT&T could just as well have drafted its own class
arbitration rules, thereby protecting itself from all of the defense-side risks cited by the Court to
defend its preemption holding. Alternatively, the arbitrator could have been entrusted to
formulate a class arbitration procedure that stayed true to the supposed essential virtues of
arbitration. Or the parties could have agreed on a class arbitration procedure after the fact, which
likely would have been sufficient to protect the integrity of the process, at least from AT&T’s
perspective.275 Absent further explanation, therefore, Discover Bank does not betray any
necessary hostility to arbitration.
Given these features of Discover Bank, a more appropriate comparison for the Court to
draw would have been to (a) laws requiring the availability of some type of discovery process or
evidentiary rules in arbitration and litigation, rather than to (b) laws requiring the availability
specifically of judicially monitored discovery or the Federal Rules of Evidence. But it is not
entirely clear that laws falling within category (a) are all that hostile to arbitration.276 Most
arbitral providers allow each party some minimal discovery,277 and arbitral awards would likely
be vacated if relevant material evidence were arbitrarily excluded.278 Moreover, because laws
falling within category (a) impose the same generic restrictions in the litigation context, it
suggests that they were intended to regulate the applicable process feature (discovery, evidence
rules, etc.) rather than the particular forum in which those features are used. If Discover Bank is
analogous to these laws, it follows from my argument that Discover Bank also does not evince the
type of purposeful discrimination toward arbitration that the FAA was designed to reverse.
As the party seeking preemption based on a pretext theory, AT&T bore the burden to
rebut this conclusion—to prove that a rule that declares class waivers unconscionable to the same
extent in arbitration as in litigation somehow purposefully discriminates only against arbitration.
In more traditional antidiscrimination contexts, a plaintiff asserting a claim of pretext is typically
required to prove not just that employers or state actors were aware of the consequences of their
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actions on protected groups but that they affirmatively intended those consequences.279 AT&T
made nothing close to this showing, however.280 The majority should, therefore, have held that
AT&T had failed to discharge its burden to prove discrimination, as it has been apt to do in more
traditional discrimination contexts.281
Instead, the majority decided the FAA preemption issue by speculating about the effect
that class actions would have on arbitration’s essential nature, thereby relieving itself and AT&T
from inquiring into discriminatory intention. In form, therefore, Concepcion amounts to a type of
reasonable accommodation decision: It exempts arbitration from a neutral, generally applicable
rule such as Discover Bank based solely on a perceived intolerable tension between the rule and
the “essence” of arbitration.282 From the standpoint of an antidiscrimination theory of FAA
preemption, this was the crucial mistake in Concepcion.

V.

CONCLUSION

In a trenchant critique of the majority’s opinion, Alan Scott Rau argues that “whatever
one can possibly spin out of all this in the way of ‘doctrine’ begins to seem increasingly
pointless . . . . [because] we are clearly quite far here from anything that bears a recognizable
resemblance to any neutral and informed process of adjudication.”283 By contrast, in this Article I
have argued that Concepcion is in fact organized around a distinct logic of antidiscrimination—a
logic that, while perhaps still unrefined and poorly understood, makes a claim to neutrality and
principle nonetheless.
It is time for us to take that logic seriously. For far too long, our failure to do so at both
the practitioner and academic levels has allowed courts and litigants to exploit ambiguities and
lacunae in our collective understanding of that logic to justify partisan, result-driven outcomes. A
more sophisticated engagement with that logic, I argue, opens up an avenue for holding courts
and litigants to the full implications of their own antidiscrimination-based arguments and
holdings. This, I hope, will help place sensible limits on the FAA’s preemption of state law.
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